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a b s t r a c t
Work throughout the history and philosophy of biology frequently employs ‘chance’, ‘unpredictability’,
‘probability’, and many similar terms. One common way of understanding how these concepts were
introduced in evolution focuses on two central issues: the first use of statistical methods in evolution
(Galton), and the first use of the concept of “objective chance” in evolution (Wright). I argue that while
this approach has merit, it fails to fully capture interesting philosophical reflections on the role of chance
expounded by two of Galton’s students, Karl Pearson and W.F.R. Weldon. Considering a question more
familiar from contemporary philosophy of biologydthe relationship between our statistical theories of
evolution and the processes in the world those theories describedis, I claim, a more fruitful way to
approach both these two historical actors and the broader development of chance in evolution.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Our discussions of the history and philosophy of evolutionary
biology continually make use of terms that may broadly be
described as falling under the umbrella of ‘chance’: ‘unpredict-
ability’, ‘randomness’, ‘stochasticity’, and ‘probability’ provide only
a few examples. We find extensive discussion in the history of
biology concerning the introduction of statisticalmethods in the life
sciences (see, e.g., Porter, 1986; Sheynin, 1980). In the spirit of
integrating the history and philosophy of science, however, it is
notable that the corresponding question about these concepts often
goes unanswered. How were the various notion of ‘chance’ now so
prevalent in the biological literature introduced into evolutionary
theorizing?
One of the only serious attempts to describe both facets of this
historical transformation was advanced by Depew and Weber
(1995), and has since been found in various places throughout
the history and philosophy of biology. Their picture of the devel-
opment of chance in evolution seeks to understand two crucial
historical events. First, when and how did evolutionary theorizing
become statistical? Second, when and how did such theories come
to be taken to describe “genuinely chancy” processes in theworld?1
Elucidating this standard view is the project of my second sec-
tion. Francis Galton, it is generally recognized, is responsible for the
first, methodological shiftdit was Galton’s work on the statistically
derived law of ancestral heredity that introduced statistics into the
study of evolution. The second, conceptual shift originates in Sewall
Wright’s shifting balance theory, which required a much more
significant role for a chancy process of genetic drift than the the-
ories which had come before it.
After introducing Depew andWeber’s view, wewill explore it in
more detail. Section 3 will return to Darwin’s own works, to
establish the now-standard interpretation that Darwin believed
evolution to be a non-statistical theory of non-objectively-chancy
processes in the world. We then turn to Francis Galton in Section 4,
where I describe his role in the development of the first statistical
methods in the study of evolution. Rather than moving on to
Wright, however, we will examine in Section 5 two of Galton’s
students at the end of the nineteenth century, Karl Pearson and
E-mail address: charles@charlespence.net.
1 The appropriate referent for “genuinely chancy” here is a very difficult problem,
as various concepts of objective chance are often conflated in the (historical and
present) literature on evolutionary theory. Thankfully, the point will not matter
substantially for us, as I will not consider how the second question should be
answered.
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W.F.R. Weldon. On Depew and Weber’s view, these two would be
minor characters.
Why, then, consider Pearson andWeldon at all? It is their work
that will serve as our point of departure from considering the
introduction of chance in terms of Depew and Weber’s two focal
historical moments. I will argue that if we are interested in the
emergence of chance in evolution, Pearson and Weldon should
indeed not be read as minor players. A vitally important distinc-
tion can be detected in Weldon and Pearson’s writings on the
philosophical justification for the use of concepts of chance.
Suitably considered, that is, we can see Pearson and Weldon as
innovators not merely in the use of statistical methodology, but in
the philosophical grounding for the use of chance as well. If we
focus only on the two events of the Depew and Weber view, we
will entirely fail to recognize this aspect of their thought. We
must look, then, for a new context for this historical devel-
opmentda new driving question on which we are able to un-
derstand the eventual philosophical rift between Pearson and
Weldon. I will argue that this distinction can be best exposed by
considering the relationship between our statistical theories and
the processeswhich thosemathematical frameworks are intended
to describe.
As regards this new question, then, a more mathematical, more
positivist school of thought, with Pearson at its head, takes these
statistics to be a tool for glossing over the (complex, possibly
deterministic or indeterministic) causal details of biological sys-
tems. On the other side, a more empiricist, experimentally inclined
school, with Weldon at its head, takes these statistics to be an
essential way of grasping the full causal detail of biological systems.
We can thus see here, I claim, a dramatic difference in the under-
standing of the connection between evolutionary theories and the
evolutionary process, positions that are better comprehended not
by way of the “reification” or “objectification” of chance, but by
considering their differing views on the relationship between
evolutionary theory and the biological world. And this question, as I
will briefly argue in the conclusion, resonates strongly with
contemporary work in the philosophy of biology.
2. Two focal events
We will begin, then, by discussing the view of the historical
development of chance laid out in Depew and Weber’s Darwinism
Evolving (1995) and echoed throughout the subsequent literature
in the history and philosophy of biology.2 The second part of their
book is devoted to describing the relationship between the
advance of a new variety of Darwinism grounded in the developing
science of genetics and what they call the “probability revolu-
tion”dthe same broad historical process that Hacking called the
“taming of chance” (Depew & Weber, 1995, p. 202). While they
sometimes refer to this revolution as a singular event, they also
helpfully subdivide it into two parts. The first is a “statistical rev-
olution,” the introduction of statistics as a tool “for collecting and
analyzing quantifiable data,” initially in the social and then in the
scientific realm (Depew & Weber, 1995, p. 203). Later, with the
addition of a robust probability theory, “the idea arose that prob-
abilities [derived from these statistics] are based on objective
propensities of real things” (Depew & Weber, 1995, p. 206). These
two ingredients combined to make the probability revolution
complete.
We see again, here, the distinction between the introduction of
statistical methods into science and the corresponding introduc-
tion of the philosophical concepts that underlie these methods.
Narrowing our view to the evolutionary realm, we are led to
investigate the two historical events mentioned in the introduc-
tion: what was the first time that the statistical revolution was
reflected in evolutionary theory (i.e., the first use of statistical
methods), and what was the first time that probability in the
genuine, objective sense was utilized (i.e., the first use of one
particular philosophical conception of chance)?
Depew and Weber go on to describe what have come to be the
standard explanations of these two events. For the first, they point
to the work of Francis Galton. “Galton,” they note, “contributed less
to the continuity of the Darwinian tradition by his substantive
views . than his conceptual and methodological ones” (Depew &
Weber, 1995, p. 201). They make extensive use of the analysis of
Hacking, who persuasively argued that Galtonwas the first not just
to use a statistical law for the description of phenomena, but also as
“autonomous,” as a law “serviceable for explanation” of those
phenomena by itself, without having to invoke a large array of
supposed (but unobserved) underlying, small causes (Hacking,
1990, p. 186). Depew and Weber note that this, as well, is the
first time that statistics is used in a positive manner for the support
of Darwinian theory, rather than as a way to attack natural
selection.3
In the case of the second eventdthe introduction of an objec-
tive, reified, or “genuine” notion of chance in evolutiondDepew
and Weber argue that “Sewall Wright opened up this Pandora’s
box” (1995, p. 287). Wright’s turn toward chance, they write, was a
way of enhancing the ability of the evolutionary process to create
novelty, to provide “more openings for creative initiations” (Depew
&Weber,1995, p. 285). Wright, therefore, completes the probability
revolution in the biological sciences. While Fisher, they argue, saw
chance as merely a source of mathematical noise, a difficulty in
theorizing which needed to be overcome and factored out, it was
Wright who first argued that evolution invoked genuinely chancy
processesdincluding random drift, the chanciness of which occa-
sionally pushed organisms down an adaptive peak and enabled
them to reach a higher neighboring optimum. On this view, we
have a shift toward ‘chance’ precisely because chance is, for the first
time, an active force which can be implicated in certain sorts of
population change (namely, change which runs contrary to fitness
gradients). The interpretation ofWright is, however, famously quite
complicated (Hodge, 1992a, pp. 287e288), and for our purposes
here I will leave the issue underdeveloped. As we will see, whether
or not Wright was indeed the first to use an objective notion of
chance is immaterial to my project.
Before continuing, I should note that by offering a new, third
focus for our historical work on chance in evolution here, I do not at
all intend to disparage either this pair of questions or the expla-
nations offered for them. Indeed, both mark significant and
important developments in the history of biology, ones which we
are right to single out for extra scrutiny. I will argue, however, that
if we restrict ourselves to only looking at the development of
chance through these lenses, we run the risk of missing significant
and important developments in the way that chance was
2 Both questions are found, at least, in Hodge (1987) and Morrison (2002). Gal-
ton’s role in the first shift has been discussed by Hacking (1990), as we will see later.
Sheynin (1980) covers the first shift extensively as well. The second question is
explored by Morizot (2012). Philosophically, many worksdsuch as Brandon and
Carson (1996), Millstein (2000), Rosenberg (2001), or Pence and Ramsey (2013)d
implicitly rely on this distinction between the (assumed) statistical nature of
evolutionary theory and the (contested) “chanciness” of biological processes.
3 The same analysis is offered by Provine (1971, pp. 22e23), Gayon (1998, p. 105),
Porter (1986, pp. 135, 284e285), and Radick (2011, p. 133).
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understood by practicing biologists.4 It is this worrydand the
example of the philosophical work of Pearson and Weldon, which
clearly fails to fit within these categoriesdthat drives me toward
producing a novel approach to understanding the development of
chance in evolution.
3. Darwin’s view
Now, let us rewind and consider Darwin’s position with respect
to the two primary historical events laid out above: is Darwin’s own
theory statistical, and does it purport to describe objectively chancy
processes?
3.1. Darwin on statistics
Darwin’s relationship to statistics is fairly clear. While Darwin
did have a copy of Quetelet’s Sur l’homme et le développement de ses
facultés in his library (Rutherford, 1908, p. 69), he did not directly
utilize statistical methods in his own work. As Manier notes, Dar-
win seemed to be unable to apply even a slightly statistical
conclusion, as in his reference to the distribution of general adap-
tations in birds arriving in a new environment (Darwin, 1837, B
55e), “without deprecating it as a facade which concealed our
ignorance” (Manier, 1978, pp. 122e123). Porter rightly notes that
Darwin’s work “can only in retrospect be construed as statistical”
(1986, p. 134). He goes on to describe a series of letters between
Karl Pearson and Francis Galton (with input from several of Dar-
win’s descendants). Pearson had hoped to show that Darwin’s own
work ought truly be considered to be statistical (in line with
Pearson’s own predilections), but Galton, after consulting with the
Darwins, replied that “I fear you must take it as a fact that Darwin
had no liking for statistics” (Porter, 1986, pp. 134e135nn.).
Thus we have, throughout the Origin, the pervasive feeling that
natural selection is intended to be a theory that utilizes only tradi-
tional, non-statistical, even largely deterministic sorts of explan-
ationsdexplanations that are justifiable by Herschel’s Newtonian-
derived vera causa standard. Several authors, particularly Jon
Hodge, have argued that Darwin’s theorywas explicitly modeled on
the ideal for scientific theorizing depicted in Herschel’s Preliminary
Discourse.5 It is for this reason that Darwin was especially stung by
Herschel’s dismissal of the Origin. “I have heard,” Darwinwrote in a
letter, “by a round-about channel, that Herschel saysmy book ‘is the
law of higgeldy-piggeldy.’ What exactly this means I do not know,
but it is evidently very contemptuous. If true this is a great blowand
discouragement” (Hull, 1973, p. 7). Darwin was no radical on this
scoredhe had hoped that his theory would be fully legitimate by
Herschel’s largely Newtonian and deterministic lights.
3.2. Darwin on chance
What about Darwin’s relationship to some sort of concept of
objective chance? Within the evolutionary process, Darwin iden-
tifies two loci where chance might operate. The first is the role of
chance in the generation of the variation upon which natural
selection is supposed to act. Frequently, Darwin argues for the
existence of this variation by extrapolation from our experience
with domesticated plants and animals. “Can it, then, be thought
improbable,” he asks, “seeing that variations useful to man have
undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful to some being in
the great and complex battle of life, should sometimes occur in the
course of thousands of generations?” (Darwin, 1859, p. 80,
emphasis added). Elsewhere he notes that horticulture, throughout
the ages, “has consisted in always cultivating the best known
variety, sowing its seeds, and, when a slightly better variety has
chanced to appear, selecting it, and so onwards” (Darwin,1859, p. 37,
emphasis added).
He seems, however, to be uncomfortable with the prominent
role of chance here. At one point in the notebooks, discussing
strength in blacksmiths, he writes that in addition to the inheri-
tance of acquired characters, “the other principle of those children,
which chance? produced with strong arms, outliving the weaker
ones, may be applicable to the formation of instincts, indepen-
dently of habits” (Darwin, 1838b, N 42). The emphasis here is
Darwin’s owndhe seems to be a bit incredulous that chance can be
the proper explanation for the appearance of variation, though he
at the time has no better story to offer. Throughout the develop-
ment of evolutionary theory it is “[m]ere chance, as we may call it,
[that] might cause one variety to differ in some character from its
parents” (Darwin, 1859, p. 111).
The second role Darwin sees for chance in the process of evo-
lution derives from the fact that natural selection is not a perfect
discriminatordit is merely the case that a profitable variation “will
tend to the preservation of that individual” which bears it, and this
will lead that individual’s offspring to “thus have a better chance of
surviving” (Darwin, 1859, p. 61, emphasis added). It must surely be
the case, he argues, that “individuals having any advantage, how-
ever slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and
of procreating their kind” (Darwin, 1859, p. 81, emphasis added).6
Nothing, however, guarantees a particular individual’s suc-
cessdthe best the evolutionary process has to offer is the promise
of higher fitness. In a passage which nicely exhibits both of
Darwin’s senses of chance, he writes that natural selection is the
process by which “every slight modification, which in the course of
ages chanced to arise, and which in any way favoured the in-
dividuals of any of the species, by better adapting them to their
altered conditions, would tend to be preserved” (Darwin, 1859, p. 82,
emphasis added).
What does Darwin actually mean by the term ‘chance’ in these
two invocations? Excepting some mentions of something like the
law of large numbers,7 Darwin rarely discusses what he takes the
correct interpretation of chance to be. One of his only sustained
considerations of the issue, at the beginning of the fourth chapter of
the Origin, is commonly cited:
I have hitherto sometimes spoken as if the variationsdso
common and multiform in organic beings under domestication,
and in a lesser degree in those in a state of naturedhad been
due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression,
but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause
of each particular variation. (Darwin, 1859, p. 131)
This is as direct an expression of a subjective, unpredictability, or
ignorance interpretation of chance as we might hope to find.
4 I also do not claim that Depew and Weber themselves argued that our focus
should be exclusive in this way, or that they failed to notice the problems that
would result. They even come close to foreshadowing the account I will develop in
Section 6 when they claim that “what was at stake in the conflict between Fisher
and Wright was how many of the conceptual resources of statistical models are
relevant to causal explanations of biological processes” (1995, p. 286).
5 Hodge’s contribution is a remarkable series of papers: (1977; 1987; 1989;
1992b; 2000; Hodge and Radick, 2009). For others, see also Lennox (2005);
Lewens (2009); Waters (2009); Hull (2009).
6 References to organisms’ “chance of surviving” or “chance of leaving offspring”
are one of Darwin’s most frequent refrains, and are incredibly common throughout
Darwin’s work. For only a small (!) cross-section of examples, see Darwin (1838a, E
137), Darwin (1859, pp. 5, 88, 90e92, 104, 109, 114, 127, 136, 176, 235, 388), Darwin
(1871, pp. 161, 265, 319e320, 406, 414).
7 See, e.g., Darwin (1871, p. 316), Darwin (1837, B 55e).
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Darwin explains that whenever he makes reference to “chance,” it
is merely an indication that we lack knowledge or predictive power
with respect to the particular causes of the phenomenon at issue.
He goes on to note that one might ascribe the source of variation to
the reproductive system, the conditions of life of the parents,
climate, food, and so forth. All of these are, that is, possible true
causes of variationdwe simply lack the precision to determine
which is genuinely responsible for variation in a given case (or even
in the majority of cases).8
Finally, we have Darwin’s famous discussion of chance from the
Variation. He considers the objection, by that point quite familiar,
that “selection explains nothing, because we know not the cause of
each individual difference in the structure of each being” (Darwin,
1875, p. 427). To reply to this objection, Darwin asks us to consider
an analogy. When rock falls from the face of a cliff, he argues, we
might call the shape of the fragments that result accidental,
but this is not strictly correct; for the shape of each depends on a
long sequence of events, all obeying natural laws; on the nature
of the rock, on the lines of deposition or cleavage, on the form of
the mountain, which depends on its upheaval and subsequent
denudation, and lastly on the storm or earthquakewhich throws
down the fragments. (Darwin, 1875, p. 427)
We then imagine assembling a structure from these stone frag-
ments. Of course, Darwin argues, an omniscient creator could
foresee all these events. But ought we really infer that all the nat-
ural laws that caused the stone to take its current shape exist for the
sake of the structure that the builder builds? Clearly not, he implies.
It is in this sense that the shape of the stones is accidental. And
natural selection works in the same way. Many of the variations in
organisms are not useful or pleasing to either man or to the animal
itself (and many of the artifically selected variations which are
pleasing to man are deleterious to the organisms). They are the
result of lawlike causal processes, but there is no senseddivine or
otherwisedin which the laws are the way they are for the sake of
the development of some particular character in some particular
organism. There is no overarching pattern to find, and for this
reason, and only in this sense, canwe view the evolutionary process
as “chancy.”
All these examples are traditionally cited when discussing
Darwin’s understanding of chance, and the standard reading of
Darwin summarizes them by claiming that he held an ignorance
interpretation of chance.9 But this agreement masks the interesting
depth of Darwin’s thought on the matter. We see throughout these
quotes an interplay of three distinct ways of understanding chance.
First is simple subjective unpredictability, as he invokes in the case
of variationdthe inability of a given observer with a given set of
evidence to predict the precise outcome of some system. Second,
and much more important for Darwin, is the concept of ‘accident’,
which we see in the discussion of the stone archdthe lack of any
sort of overarching design, any “for the sake of which” or final
cause. Finally we have objective chance, which Darwin consistently
interprets as some sort of lack of causation.
This last sensedobjective chancedis categorically rejected by
Darwin. It is clear that Manier is correct when he states that Darwin
“attributed no causal force to chance itself” (1978, p. 121). All cau-
ses, in Darwin’s view, are still perfectly Newtonian; both the stone
building example in the Variation and the discussion of variation in
the sixth edition of the Origin are very clear about this position.
Variation, in general, is more about unpredictability for Darwindit
is the bulk material, viewed throughout the Origin as a black box,
a fact that provides a necessary and empirically well-confirmed
(if inexplicable) input to the evolutionary process.
When Darwin discusses the possibility of chance in the process
of natural selection, on the other hand, his worry is with design, and
hence he is primarily concerned in this arena with chance in the
sense of accident. The particular sequence of variations which any
particular population undergoes lacks any master plan, and is thus
to this extent a matter of chance. While it is therefore a conse-
quence of selection that many features of organisms are accidental,
Darwin still rejected objective chance as applied to the process
of selection. To return to our original question, thendwhether or
not Darwin thought the evolutionary process was objectively
chancydwe have ample evidence to answer it firmly in the nega-
tive. Evolution does not involve objectively chancy processes for
Darwin.
Such, then, is the state of affairs as of 1859. Darwin has proposed
the theory of evolution by natural selection, a non-statistical theory
of non-objectively-chancy processes in nature. Complex processes,
to be suredprocesses the details of which may forever escape our
knowledge. But the theory itself is intended to conform to Her-
schel’s vera causa ideal, which, according to Herschel, grounds the
explanatory power and prowess of Newtonian mechanics. While
Darwin may have been far more willing to appeal to (again, his
sense of) chance than many of his contemporaries, and while he
may have placedmuchmore of the living world under the guidance
of an accidental process free of final causes than those who had
come before him, we don’t see a drastic shift in the role of either
statistical theorizing or objective chance in Darwin’s work. As of
yet, we have seen neither of the historical events for which we are
searching. Let us then move forward to Francis Galton.
4. Statistical theories: Francis Galton
What was the main driving force behind the introduction of
statistics into the theory of evolution by natural selection? As it
turns out, it was an old problem. As early as the “Sketch” of 1842,
Darwinwas worried about blending inheritance.Hewrites that “if in
any country or district all animals of one species be allowed freely
to cross, any small tendency in them to vary will be constantly
counteracted” (Darwin, 1909, p. 3), destroying the power of natural
selection to alter the species. The point was made far more serious
in the review of the Origin by the engineer Fleeming Jenkin (1867).
Gayon notes that the thrust of this paper is oftenmisunderstood
(1998, pp. 96e97). Jenkin is not merely concerned with the
apparent reliance of Darwin’s theory on “sports,” or large de-
viations of characters from parent to offspring. Rather, he notes the
following two interrelated (and much more complex and signifi-
cant) problems with Darwin’s theory as expressed in the Origin.
First, how is variation distributed? If the distribution is continuous,
then we must use statistics to describe it. If, on the other hand, it is
not a continuous, populational sort of variation, but rather indi-
vidual and isolated instances, these instances must be measured,
and the odds of some particular variation being eliminated by
chance must be determined. Second, what is the method of
transmission of characters to offspring? If offspring carry a mixture
of the characters of their parents, as Darwin and most others
assumed, how can the problem of regression to the mean be
avoided?
Depew and Weber argue that Darwin’s own response to this
problem is highly unsatisfactory. In the last two editions of the
Origin, all he does to respond to this charge is to posit the existence
of more continuous variation and fewer “sports”das Depew and
Weber note, “by fiat,” changing the singular nouns referring to
8 This discussion is even more explicit in the sixth edition of the Origin (Darwin,
1876, pp. 6e8).
9 Commentators to argue for such a view include Hull (1973, pp. 62, 426e427),
Hodge (1987, p. 243), Depew and Weber (1995, p. 113), and Beatty (2006, p. 630).
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variation to plurals (1995, p.196). Given that Darwin’s response here
was so unsatisfying, what was to be done about the problems that
Jenkin raised? The long-term solution, of course, was the rejection
of the blendingmodel of inheritance. But thiswould have towait for
the “rediscovery” ofMendel’s paper and the birth of genetics, almost
thirty years after Darwin’s death (Druery & Bateson, 1901).
In themeanwhile, defenders of Darwin’s theory sought refuge in
statisticsdestablishing how natural selection could work in a
gradualist, statistical manner on populational, continuous varia-
tion. The most prominent early defender was Darwin’s cousin
Francis Galton. The publication of Darwin’s Origin sparked in him a
deep interest in breedingdparticularly in eugenics and the he-
redity of human intelligence and other abilities. To that end, Galton
found two things unsettling about the trouble with blending in-
heritance. First was the potential undermining of his cousin’s the-
ory of evolution by natural selection, which Galton had described in
a letter to Darwin as engendering “a feeling that one rarely expe-
riences after boyish days, of having been initiated into an entirely
new province of knowledge which, nevertheless, connects itself
with other things in a thousand ways” (Galton & Darwin, 1859). But
second, andmore importantly, were the eugenic implications of the
blending argument. Unless heredity and variationwork in precisely
the right way, it remains possible that the eugenic program is a
failure before it begins: that even with the aid of severe eugenic
programs, we will still be unable to preserve “superior” characters
within the families that are entitled to them.
Thus was the problem of blending inheritance doubly magnified
for Galton. How did he propose to resolve it? He began with a
radically different view of the way in which inheritance operates.
Relatively early during his study of heredity, Galton shifted to a
population-based, statistical view of the transmission of characters
from parents to offspring (Porter, 1986, p. 136). Galton used this
perspective to develop a view of particulate inheritance on which
many small heritable factorsdsome “latent” and some “developed”
or “patent” in the adultdcombine and compete for a small number
of “places” within the offspring. The closest metaphor we can
create for such inheritance, Galton writes, is this. Consider “an urn
containing a great number of balls, marked in various ways, and a
handful to be drawn out of them at random as a sample: this
sample would represent the person of a parent [his or her devel-
oped characters].” Thenwemix another, similarly sized urn in with
the first, representing the contribution of the other parent, and
drawout a second sample. “There can be no nearer connexion justly
conceived to subsist between the parent and child than between
the two samples” (Galton, 1872, p. 400).
The very foundations of heredity, therefore, can now be
considered statisticallydas a vast, population-level urn-drawing
experiment. Heredity thus was, from the time of Galton’s first ar-
ticles on the subject, best dealt with at the statistical level. From
here, we can turn toward mathematizing the relationship between
parent and offspring.
The primary mathematical contribution to evolutionary theo-
rizing made by Galton himself, the law of ancestral heredity, de-
scribes the extent to which the contribution of heritable characters
in ancestors influences the characters of offspringd“the integra-
tion of all hereditary phenomena in a single conceptual framework
or expression,” in the words of Gayon (1998, p. 132). In Natural
Inheritance, Galton describes the law as follows:
[T]he influence, pure and simple, of the Mid-Parent [the average
of the mother and father] may be taken as 1/2 and that of the
Mid-Grand-Parent [the average of all four grandparents] as 1/4,
and so on. Consequently the influence of the individual Parent
would be 1/4, and of the individual Grand-Parent 1/16, and so
on. (Galton, 1889, p. 136)
Galton is attempting to do the following. Consider the characters of
an offspring. We know that there is a strong force of regression to
the mean, so the interesting question becomes: at what fidelity are
the characters of parents (and earlier ancestors) transmitted to
their offspring? Galton first determined empirically that the coef-
ficient of correlation between sons and ‘mid-parents’ was 2/3.
However, this correlation includes not only characters from the
parents themselves, but also some from the grandparents passed
on to the parents and then the offspringdwe have to “factor out”
this grandparental contribution if wewant to determine the “pure”
contribution of the parent. By two separate estimations (one
assuming a constant diminution of transmission in all generations
and one assuming a diminution that increases over time), Galton
arrives at the value of 1/2 for the mid-parent contribution.
Galton’s technical conclusions aside, we can clearly see the tools
and methods of statistics deeply embedded in his work. The value
upon which the entire derivation of the law of ancestral heredity
rests, the mid-parent to offspring correlation of 2/3, was deter-
mined empirically via regression on measurements of height, and
Galton sought to confirm it via statistical measurement of moth
populations, human eye-color, artistic talent, disease, and so forth.
Galton has, indisputably, brought statistics to a central component
of evolution, and statistics proved to be here to stay. We thus very
clearly find in the work of Galton the first historical event for which
we have been searchingdevolutionary theorizing now involves
statistical methods.
But note the depth of the use of statisticsdGalton’s concern
with eugenics and breedingmeans that we only have this statistical
viewpoint in heredity, not in any other, related biological theories.
Galton at times gestures at a statistical view of natural selection
(e.g., Galton, 1877b, p. 533), but not in anything like a robust or
empirically grounded way. The thorough integration of statistics
into further areas of evolution would be executed by Pearson and
Weldon, to whom we will turn below.
4.1. Galton on chance
What about the role of objective chance in Galton’s theorizing?
He is nearly silent on this issue, but we can divine two conclusions.
First, return to Galton’s discussion of his statistical theory of he-
redity. Galton sees both the transmission of elements to offspring
and the development of organisms as complex but necessarily
strictly Newtonian or mechanistic causal processes. He describes
“segregation” as a straightforward process of competition (which
Radick (2011) has likened to natural selection), saying that “for each
place [in an organism’s set of developed characters] there have
been many unsuccessful but qualified competitors” (Galton, 1872,
p. 395). On development, he says that if we had sufficient infor-
mation, “statistical experiences would no doubt enable us to pre-
dict the average value of the form into which they would become
developed . but the individual variation of each case would of
course be great, owing to the large number of variable influences
concerned in the process of development” (Galton, 1872, p. 396,
emphasis added). This sounds much like Quetelet’s view of social
statistics as the result of the aggregation of a myriad small, non-
statistical causes.
Second, we can consider Galton’s famous use of the quincunx
device. Consider the outcome of dropping a handful of shot into the
top of the device in Fig. 1. The shot falls through the series of pins
set in the board, and collects at the bottom in a series of bins. The
shot will, Galton notes, pile up in these bins in precisely the dis-
tribution described by the normal curve (shown at the bottom of
the device). Importantly for us, consider Galton’s description of
how the device approximates the law of errors:
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The principle on which the action of the apparatus depends is,
that a number of small and independent accidents befall each
shot in its career. In rare cases, a long run of luck continues to
favour the course of a particular shot towards either outside
place, but in the large majority of instances the number of ac-
cidents that cause Deviation to the right, balance in a greater or
less degree those that cause Deviation to the left. [. ] This
illustrates and explains why mediocrity is so common. (Galton,
1889, pp. 64e65)
Setting aside, for our purposes, the moral overtone present in Gal-
ton’s invocation of ‘mediocrity’, here we have another instance of
precisely the samesense of chancewesawexpressedbyDarwin. The
law of errors is nothing more or less than the record of a very large
number of small, deterministic causes acting on the same system
over timedand it is merely our ignorance, or our inability to follow
those “runs of luck,” that makes the use of statistics necessary.
But the full tale of Galton’s view of chance must be slightly more
complicated than this. For the analogy between the quincunx and
the “large number of variable influences” in heredity is not a perfect
one. The most common way of describing the law of errors in
Galton’s day comes from Quetelet, who, Galton was right to note,
believed that the “essence” of the law of errors “is that differences
should be wholly due to the collective actions of a host of inde-
pendent petty influences in various combinations, as was repre-
sented by the teeth of the harrow [in the quincunx]” (Galton,1877a,
p. 512). Quetelet, that is, had argued that a normal distribution
arises by subjecting an object (be it a piece of shot or a person) to a
long sequence of minor (or “petty”), independent causes, leading to
the pattern of “runs of luck” and “balance” that Galton described.10
But this cannot be the full explanation of heredity, despite the fact
that heredity produces normal distributions. “[A]lthough charac-
teristics of plants and animals conform to the law [of errors],” he
argues, “the reason of their doing so is as yet totally unexplained,”
because the processes of heredity “are not petty influences, but
very important ones” (Galton, 1877a, p. 512). Far from the minor
tweaks to the direction of the shot applied by the teeth of the
quincunx, the influences of heredity dramatically shape the course
of an organism’s life. Thus, we are forced to conclude “that the
processes of heredity must work harmoniously with the law of
deviation, and be themselves in some sense conformable to it”
(Galton, 1877a, p. 512). While Galton does not therefore believe the
statistical account of heredity is a direct analog of the behavior of
the quincunx, we must explain the fact that the various non-
statistical and decidedly non-petty processes of heredity are
“conformable” to statistical explanation.
Whatever the account of this coincidence, we clearly have no
cause for inferring anything other than an interpretation of chance
as unpredictability for Galton. The laws derived for the various
processes of heredity, he argues, “may never be exactly correct in
any one case, but at the same time they will always be approxi-
mately true and always serviceable for explanation” (Galton, 1877b,
p. 532). It is clear that it is merely our ignorance of the precise
details of these processes that makes higher-level statistical laws
necessary and particularly “serviceable.” If we are looking for the
first invocation of objective chance, we are not to find it in the work
of Galton.
5. Pearson and Weldon: minor characters?
Following the narrative of Depew and Weber, we would now
move our focus forward to the work of Sewall Wright, where we
would find the first instance of chancy evolutionary processes in his
shifting-balance theory. Wright argued that (as one of the phases of
the shifting-balance process) the chancy influence of genetic drift
could produce novelty by driving a population down a fitness
gradient, against the direction of selection, moving it across a
“valley” of lower fitness to a new local optimum. We will not here,
however, evaluate this second historical eventdDepew and Weber
may well be quite correct that the first instance of objectively
chancy theories is found in the work of Wright. Rather, I want to
advance a much shorter increment, to two of Galton’s stu-
dentsdKarl Pearson and W.F.R. Weldon.
Pearson, whose life has been masterfully detailed by Porter
(2004), was a particularly interesting character. He studied at
Cambridge, and after having received his degreewithMathematical
Honors, departed for Germany, becoming deeply affected by the
Romantic tradition and publishing and lecturing on German his-
tory.11 He developed an intense interest in socialist politics as well
as women’s rights. Finally, upon returning to England, he was
appointed chair of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics at Uni-
versity College, London, where he was primarily occupied with
teaching mathematics to students of engineering. His work there,
which included teaching geometry and drawing, would have a
substantial influence on the significant visual aspect of his later
work in statistics.
His completion of William Kingdon Clifford’s Common Sense of
the Exact Sciences (1885) provided an early glimpse of Pearson’s
philosophy of the physical sciences. Broadly positivist in nature-
dthat is, emphasizing the importance of mathematical formulas in
the development of scientific knowledge and espousing a strict
Fig. 1. Galton’s quincunx device used to demonstrate the normal curve. Figure 7 from
Galton (1889, p. 63).
10 Quetelet himself called these “accidental causes,” which “only manifest
themselves fortuitously and act indifferently in any direction” (Quetelet in 1846,
quoted in Hankins, 1908, p. 129). It is these causes that produce the variance seen in
a normally distributed quantity, by contrast with “constant” causes, which set the
mean. 11 This brief biography follows that presented by Pearson’s son in Pearson (1936).
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form of empiricismdhe would go on to develop this philosophy of
science in his widely knownmagnum opus, the Grammar of Science,
first published in 1892 and later revised and expanded (with more
material on evolution) in 1900.
W.F.R. Weldon, known as Raphael, was born in 1860.12 He
attended University College and later King’s College, studying
biology under Lankester and Balfour. After obtaining his degree, he
worked at both the Naples Zoological Station and Cambridge,
finally being appointed as Lecturer in Invertebrate Morphology at
University College, London, in 1884. He became quite active in the
Marine Biological Laboratory at Plymouth after its completion in
1888, eventually running several large-scale experiments there.
In 1890, Weldon was appointed to the Jodrell Professorship of
Zoology at University College, London, and Weldon and Pearson
quickly formed a friendship. Pearson had been driven to the study
of biology by reading Galton’s Natural Inheritance, which had been
published the year before (Pearson, 1936, pp. 210e211), and, early
in 1890, Weldon had published his first work applying statistics to
biology (Weldon, 1890). The mathematics in Weldon’s paper had
been prepared under the direct tutelage of Galton himself, whowas
sent the paper as a referee (Pearson, 1906, p. 17). A bit later, in
November 1891, Pearson delivered the first of the Gresham College
Lectures in Geometry. He would go on to deliver thirty lectures in
this series on the subject of chance and statisticsdin particular,
focusing on visual aids and graphical representations of various
kinds to make the material accessible to a broad student audience
(Porter, 2004, pp. 235e236). As time went on, however, evolution
featured ever more strongly in the lecture content. We can see,
Porter notes, “a vision. taking form, even as he wrote his lectures,
that evolution by natural selection could be comprehended statis-
tically” (Porter, 2004, p. 238).
By this point, then, the collaboration between Pearson and
Weldon was off to the races. Nearly all of Weldon’s papers from
1893 until his untimely death from pneumonia in 1906 involved
statistical collaboration with Pearson, and Pearson would publish a
series of some twelve papers titled “Mathematical Contributions to
the Theory of Evolution,” describing various applications of statis-
tical methodology to the evolutionary process. With Weldon’s
death and the increasingly hostile climate of the battle between the
biometricians and Mendelians, Pearson would largely abandon the
study of biology after 1906, taking over the directorship of Galton’s
Eugenics Laboratory at University College (Pearson,1936;Magnello,
1999a, b).
Let us now consider how Pearson and Weldon fare as regards
the two historical events that have formed our framework here: do
they utilize statistical methods for the study of evolution, and do
they consider this to be undergirded by an objective notion of
chance extant in the world? We will discover that, on Depew and
Weber’s view, Pearson and Weldon are relatively garden-variety:
their situation with respect to our two focal questions is identical
with their mentor Galton’s.
As far as the statistical nature of evolutionary theorizing,
whereas Galton deployed statistical methods primarily within the
study of heredity, Pearson andWeldon also brought statistics to the
study of variation, inheritance, correlation, and natural and sexual
selectionda much broader swath of biological theories. While
Galton, as we mentioned above, viewed portions of evolutionary
theory statistically, much more of evolution was to be studied sta-
tistically for Pearson and Weldon. Pearson, for example, in the
second edition of his Grammar of Science, claims that only the
growth of the statistical picture of evolution hadmade it possible to
provide a “precise definition of fundamental biological concepts”
(1900, p. 372). We thus have the introduction of a thoroughgoing
statistical methodology in portions of evolutionary theorizing
where Galton’s use of statistics had only been cursory. Pearson
and Weldon’s combination of mathematics and experiment was
exceptionally productive.
What about their views on the role of an objective notion of
chance in biology? Because of the positivist bent in Pearson’s work,
he did not believe, nor could he consistently have believed, that our
scientific theories somehow latch onto objective chance in the
world. Objective, reified chance is an inhabitant of the realm of
things-in-themselves, which Pearson barred from his philosophy.
He thus offers an ignorance interpretation of the scientific use of
probabilities, just as Galton and Darwin had before him. In a section
titled “The Bases of Laplace’s Theory lie in an Experience as to
Ignorance” (Pearson, 1892, p. 171), he argues that the underlying
justification behind the use of probabilistic claims in science is an
equiprobability assumption, and this equiprobability assumption is
justified as the best course of action in the face of ignorance: “In our
ignorance we ought to consider before experience that nature may
consist of all routines, all anomalies, or a mixture of the two in any
proportion whatever, and that all such are equiprobable” (Pearson,
1892, p. 172). He goes on to offer an extensive justification of why
our past experience with situations of incomplete information does
indeed justify the use of equiprobability as a canon of legitimate
inference.
Weldon, as well, affirms a straightforward interpretation of
chance as subjective unpredictability. In a lecture he delivered the
year before his death (to which wewill return later), he argued that
“all experience, which we are obliged to deal with statistically, is
experience of results which depend upon a great number of
complicated conditions, so many and so difficult to observe that we
cannot tell in any given case what their effect will be” (Weldon,
1906, p. 97). Weldon, again, follows Darwin, Galton, and Pearson
in adopting a notion of chance grounded entirely in ignorance. The
introduction of an objective notion of chance in evolution is not to
be found in the work of either Pearson or Weldon.
6. A new question
The explanation given by the standard history of the early
development of chance in evolution is relatively straightforward.
We begin with Darwin, who develops a non-statistical theory of
non-objectively-chancy biological systems. Galton, endeavoring to
respond to the troubles of blending inheritance, statisticalizes the
theory of heredity. Pearson and Weldon expand this usage of sta-
tistics to selection itself, making them only methodological in-
novators. Neither Galton nor his students discard Darwin’s
ignorance interpretation of chance in the objective biological
worlddthis was Sewall Wright’s doing, introducing objective
chance in the context of his shifting balance theory.
If we consider merely the two events brought out in Depew and
Weber’s analysis, it is not obvious why Pearson and Weldon are
even worthy of mention at all, much less of a systematic develop-
ment of their views on chance. Pearson and Weldon innovate only
in terms of the use of statistical methodology to understand evo-
lutiondthey have nothing new to offer in terms of their conceptual
or philosophical views. On the contrary, the case of Pearson and
Weldon, I argue, is an excellent example for use in teasing apart
more thoroughly the history of the introduction of concepts of
chance in evolutionary theorizing. Most worryingly, if we adopt
Depew and Weber’s focus on objective chance, two issues make it
difficult even to frame the question of Pearson and Weldon’s use of
such a concept. First, as with all examinations of the conceptual
entailments of biological theories, we are hampered by biologists’
12 This brief biography follows Pearson’s memorial of Weldon (Pearson, 1906). No
scholarly biography of Weldon has as yet been prepared.
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uncertain attitude toward the metaphysical or ontological claims of
their theories (see, e.g., Waters, 2011, on ‘toolbox’ theorizing).
Second, despite the fact that some early work on chance in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did make room for the
possibility of genuine indeterminism in the sense that Depew and
Weber consider, we have no evidence that ‘chance’ in this sense
was a concept entertained by any of the authors whose work we
have considered here.13
Pearson and Weldon, however, were far from silent on the
proper role of and philosophical justification for the use of concepts
of chance in evolution. A schism that developed between the two
men, often unremarked-upon in the historical literature, reveals
that they were engaged in a serious, long-standing debate over
precisely this issue. What problem, then, drove them to develop
well-considered justifications for the role and utility of chance?
This, I claim, is precisely the impetus we need to develop a new
way of understanding the role of chance in the early development
of evolution. The two historical events of the Depew and Weber
view do not capture the philosophical work of Pearson andWeldon,
so it is beholden upon us to find a way of framing the issues that
allows us to recognize and comprehend it. The best candidate for
this new question, I argue, is this: What is the relationship between
biological systems and the statistical theories used to describe them?
This question lets us most clearly see the subtle difference between
Weldon and Pearson’s views, and enables us to better explore this
facet of the early history of chance in evolution.
6.1. Pearson contra Weldon
Let’s return to Pearson’s philosophy of science. Though the two
men were unknown to each other at the time, we can recognize
what we would now call a “Machian” view of physics as much of
the motivation for Pearson’s Grammardindeed, Mach would write
to Pearson in 1897, plaintively noting “how useful would it have
been for me to know back in 1872 that I didn’t stand alone in my
efforts.”14 Pearson focuses extensively on the usefulness of science
for the economy of thought, denigrates the speculative use of
‘metaphysics’ in science, and extensively praises an austere form of
empiricism.
In the Grammar of Science, for example, he writes that the last
step of the scientific method is
the discovery by aid of the disciplined imagination of a brief
statement or formula, which in a few words resumes the whole
range of facts. Such a formula . is termed a scientific law. The
object served by the discovery of such laws is the economy of
thought. (Pearson, 1892, p. 93)
Further, the discovery of these simplified laws of nature must
remain the central focus of our work in the biological sciences in
particular. In the second edition of Pearson’s Grammar, he notes
that the advance of statistical biology “enables me to define several
of these conceptions much more accurately than was possible in
1892” (Pearson, 1900, pp. viiieix). Statistics has finally endowed us
with the ability to demonstrate evolution’s action quantitatively.
After discussing the various types of selection that have been pro-
posed, Pearson writes that “before we can accept [any cause of
progressive change] as a factor we must not only have shown its
plausibility, but if possible have demonstrated its quantitative
validity” (Pearson, 1900, p. 380).
And when such a focus on statistics has failed to hold (in
particular, in the study of variation) it has led to a stagnation in
biologydin Pearson’s words,
largely owing to a certain prevalence of almost metaphysical
speculation as to the causes of heredity, which have usurped the
place of that careful collection and elaborate experiment by
which alone sufficient data might have been accumulated, with
a view to ultimately narrowing and specialising the circum-
stances under which correlationwasmeasured. (Pearson,1896a,
p. 255)
We can thus see a profound trend in Pearson’s thought, rein-
forced throughout his work both in the general philosophy of
science and specifically in biometry. For him, laws of nature are
nothing more than brief formulas describing a trend in observed
data, useful first and foremost for economizing thought and
enabling prediction. The same is true for causes, as welldhe argues
that causation is nothing more than the experience “that a certain
sequence has occurred and recurred in the past” (Pearson, 1892, p.
136), such sequences being described, of course, by mathematized
laws of nature.
Now, let’s turn toWeldon. As I mentioned briefly above, in 1906,
a lecture by Weldon on the topic of inheritance (delivered the
previous year) was published in a volume of Lectures on the Method
of Science.While the bulk of the lecture is relatively uninteresting (if
not downright confusing), Weldon begins by offering a conceptual
defense of his use of statistical methods.
In physics, he argues, we have two uses for statistical inference.
First, it averages over errors in measurement. Weldon gives the
example of the determination of the latitude of the Radcliffe
Observatorydeven though highly skilled workers are responsible
for its measurement, the values obtained fall into a range, in terms
of the observatory’s position, of about thirty-four yards (Weldon,
1906, p. 86). One function of taking a single number and
declaring it the latitude of the observatory, then, is to average over
small errors in these various measurements. Second, statistics
generates values that we wish to utilize in calculations. Weldon
notes that even though it may be the case that there is no single
value for the latitude of the observatory (due to, for example,
changes over time in the position of the equator), we still may use
statistics for “attributing to the latitude of the Radcliffe telescope a
constancy it does not really possess” (Weldon, 1906, p. 88).
The ideal, then, in the physical sciences, is to be able to use a
method which can separate these two sorts of discrepancydwhich
can describe all of the results thus far obtained, discarding human
error in measurement without discarding the genuine variability in
the data. Should we apply statistics to biology in precisely the same
way? No, Weldon argues. The variation in the biological case is too
great. “[I]f I tell you,” he writes, “that Englishmen are 5 feet 7(1/2)
inches high, you remember your father who is five feet ten, and
your cousin who is over six feet, and you think I am talking
nonsense” (Weldon, 1906, p. 94). The kind of simplifying use of
statistics deployed in the physical sciences doesn’t work in biology.
Rather, we need a way to capture all of the variation in biological
systemsdwe need to collect and preserve statistical data in its
entirety, in order to come up with a complete description of our
observations. He writes
If wewant tomake a statement about the stature of Englishmen,
we must find a way of describing our whole experience; we
must find some simple way of describing our whole experience,
so that we can easily remember and communicate to others how
13 For various objective uses of chance prior to the introduction of quantum
mechanics, see, for example, Stöltzner (2008) on the Exner school in physics, Beatty
(1984) for a brief mention of the relationship between Darwin and Peirce’s tychism,
or Dale (1999, p. 399) for John Venn’s frequentist theory of probability.
14 “Wie werthvoll wäre es mir gewesen schon 1872 zu wissen, dass ich mit
meinen Bestrebungen nicht allein stehe.” Ernst Mach to Karl Pearson, Jul. 12, 1897,
published in Thiele (1969, p. 537).
C.H. Pence / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 50 (2015) 48e58 55
many men of any given height we find among a thousand
Englishmen. We must give up the attempt to replace our ex-
periences by a simple average value and try to describe the
whole series of results our observation has yielded. (Weldon,
1906, p. 94)
Here, I think, we see the first glimmer of a profound difference
between Pearson and Weldon. Statistics in biometry, as described
here, is most emphatically not useful for the economization of
thought or the simplification of phenomena, as we saw in Pearson
above. Statistics is a way of describing all the results which we have
obtained thus far, of preserving all our experience, not simplifying
it. Weldon brings statistics to biometry, then, to preserve diversi-
tydvery nearly the opposite of Pearson’s motivation.
We can see this distinction between the two men confirmed
elsewhere as well. An extended debate in the correspondence
pages ofNature in 1895 and 1896 focused, in large part, onWeldon’s
own definition of causation. For Weldon, causation and correlation
are identical. As the issue is reported by an incredulous E. Ray
Lankester, Weldon describes Lankester as “illogical” for suggesting
that we might declare the “cause” of survival in malarial regions to
be due to some unknown property of the blood. “‘It is,’ said Prof.
Weldon, ‘impossible logically to separate these two correlated
phenomena. The coloured skin is as much a cause of the survival of
the dark man as is the germ-destroying property of his blood’”
(Lankester, 1896, p. 245). For Weldon, that is, causation simply is
correlation. And while we might later break these correlations by
performing experiments or providing new data, until such tests are
performed the complete causal picture of the scenario is encap-
sulated by the statistics. Oddly, Weldon seems to think that Hume
would agreedhe cites Hume’s definition from the Inquiry of cause
as constant conjunction in a later letter (Weldon, 1896, p. 294),
implying that his appeal to statistical distributions would pass
muster as a variety of Humean constant conjunction.
Perhaps most tellingly of all, Pearson responds to the fight be-
tween Weldon and Lankesterdand sides with Lankester.
On the second point [causation], surely Prof. Lankester is
entirely in the right? It is not sufficient to show that there is a
correlation between a certain frontal ratio and death-rate [in
Weldon’s experiments on crabs] in order to assert that the
frontal ratio is a cause of death-rate. Very probably it may be, but
the definition is not logically complete, or at any rate a definition
of cause has been adopted which does not appear of much
utility to science. (Pearson, 1896b, pp. 460e461)
The upshot of Pearson’s response should be clear from our
(admittedly brief) discussion of the two men’s use of statistics,
causation, and laws.15 For Pearson, the sort of simple correlation
described by Weldon is too weak a form of functional dependence
to support the inference of causation. We need more data to make
the description “logically complete”dto provide us with a more
robust formula, something more closely resembling the functional
laws of Newtonian mechanics.
While this distinction has been drawn quickly, we can see some
general conclusions about theways inwhich the twomen approach
the statistical method. For Pearson, science is a positivist enterprise
aimed at the economy of thought, with statistics useful for
simplification of data. Causation, then, to the extent that it remains
a relevant concept at all, is cashed out in terms of laws of nature,
which are precise instances of functional dependence (modeled
after Newtonian mechanics). For Weldon, on the contrary, ideal
science is the complete description of nature, and statistics is the
best tool we have to capture the wide diversity of causal influences
in biological cases. Causation just is correlation, and the purpose of
experiment is to sharpen these correlations.
Most importantly, we can see that the two historical events
described by the standard history do not give us any leverage on
this distinction whatsoever. There’s no hint of “objective” or
“reified” chance in the work of either of these thinkers, as I argued
in the last sectiondyet we still have an incredibly interesting sci-
entific and philosophical difference between the two men which is
worthy of study. What possible question might we ask that would
allow us to take this distinction into account? Again, I claim that it is
this: what is the relationship between our statistical theories and the
world those theories are intended to describe?
On this axis, we can see that the two men are quite different.
Pearson’s positivist use of statistics as an intermediate step on the
way to fully rigorized scientific knowledge entails that, for him,
scientific theories are merely provisional, and, it would seem,
necessarily acausal and anti-realist. Knowledge of biological pro-
cesses “in the world” is meaningless for Pearson, and it is even
doubtful that wewould ever be able to provide sufficiently detailed
theories in biology to qualify as fully rigorous law by Pearson’s
standards.
Weldon, on the other hand, nearly collapses the distinction
between scientific theories and the corresponding processes in the
world. The statistical descriptions deployed by the theory, for
Weldon, just are descriptions of the systems’ causal structuredthe
final aim of science for Weldon, it seems, is to construct a complete
statistical picture of the world.
Approaching the case of Pearson andWeldon by considering the
question of the relationship between statistical theories and bio-
logical processes, then, is incredibly fruitful. It lets us contextualize
both the extensive work of the two authors in justifying the role of
statistics in biological practice, and it enables us to see precisely
where and why the two men disagreed when they did, on the
matter of how we successfully obtain causal knowledge about a
biological system.
7. Conclusion
Let me conclude a bit more speculatively. (If one is disinclined to
countenance speculation, I also note that the historical claim for
which I’ve argued above stands independently of the value of this
closing idea.) For those who have been following contemporary
philosophy of biology in the last decade, the novel question I posit
herewill not seem so novel after all. Precisely the sameworry about
the relationship between statistical theories and biological pro-
cesses has been hotly debated, under the guise of the “causalist/
statisticalist debate.” On the one side, we have “causalists,” who
argue that natural selection and genetic drift describe causally
efficacious processes (e.g., Abrams, 2009; Brandon, 1978; Hodge,
1987; Mills & Beatty, 1979; Otsuka, Turner, Allen, & Lloyd, 2011;
Ramsey, 2006; Stephens, 2004). They are opposed by the “statis-
ticalists,” who claim on the contrary that these theories are merely
statistical summaries of genuinely causal events at the level of the
individual organism (e.g., Ariew & Ernst, 2009; Ariew & Lewontin,
2004; Krimbas, 2004; Matthen & Ariew, 2002; Walsh, 2007;
Walsh, 2010; Walsh, Lewens, & Ariew, 2002).
While I lack the space to defend this claim in anything like the
detail it deserves, it seems tome plausible that the question at work
in the current debate is precisely that at issue between Pearson and
Weldon: how are our statistical theories to relate to biological
processes in the world? I do not mean to identify either Pearson or
15 More detail on both the debate between Weldon, Pearson, and Lankester and
the context of the 1906 Weldon lecture can be found in Pence (2011). Weldon’s
lecture is also discussed by Radick (2011). I can find no other citation or discussion
of this lecture, so I have no evidence that it was read by Pearson and Weldon’s
contemporaries.
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Weldon’s views with either side in this debate, and we of course
see nothing like the sophistication of today’s propensity in-
terpretations of fitness, population genetics, and so on in the 1890s.
But this is certainly an interesting casedwe have an instancewhere
it seems that a historical case can be better understood by consid-
ering it in light of a contemporary philosophical question than by
the commonways inwhich it is considered in the history of biology.
That, I think, is a powerful argument for the integration of the
history and philosophy of science.
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us in the history and philosophy of biology) owe a great debt.
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